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Privacy-Preserving Verifiable Incentive Mechanisms for Crowd
Sensing Applications
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Crowd sensing, as a new paradigm that leverages pervasive smartphones to efficiently collect and upload
sensing data, recently has been intensively explored. Incentive mechanisms with the truthfulness are pro-
posed to attract extensive users to participate so as to achieve good service quality, enabling numerous novel
applications. Although these mechanisms are so promising, there still exist many security and privacy chal-
lenges in real-life environments, such as cost privacies, sensing preferences, and the payment behavior of
the platform (the crowd sensing application organizer). In this paper, we present two privacy-preserving
verifiable incentive mechanisms for crowd sensing applications with homogeneous services, heterogeneous
services, and submodular services under the budget constraint, not only to explore how to protect the privacy
of the users and platform, but also to ensure the verifiable correctness of payments between the platform and
users for crowd sensing applications. Results show that our general privacy-preserving verifiable incentive
mechanisms achieve the same results as the generic one without privacy preservation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
More recently, crowd sensing have emerged as an effective and efficient way to solve
complex sensing issues [Ma et al. 2014]. For instance, Nericell [Mohan et al. 2008],
SignalGruru [Koukoumidis et al. 2011], and VTrack [Thiagarajan et al. 2009] for pro-
viding omnipresent traffic information, Ear-Phone [Rana et al. 2010] and NoiseTube
[Maisonneuve et al. 2009] for making noise maps. Although these crowd sensing ap-
plications have been developed, incentive mechanisms are necessary to achieve good
service quality. Consequently, some researchers such as Singer et al, separately
propose the auction mechanisms to incentivize extensive users to participate in
crowd sensing applications so as to meet the previous service demands [Singer 2010;
Singer and Mittal 2013; Yang et al. 2012]. These novel mechanisms guarantee the
truthful participation of users by determining near-optimal prices of assignments for
crowd sensing applications with the budget constraint. More importantly, the mech-
anisms are incentive compatible, budget feasible, and have competitive ratio perfor-
mance and performs well in practice, thereby ensuring these mechanisms applicable
to crowd sensing applications.
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Despite their merits, payments’ verifiability and privacy issues, two critical human
factors in crowd sensing applications, have not been fully explored. A common hypoth-
esis made in the above mechanisms is that the involved parties will follow the proto-
cols honestly without the concern of their privacy. However, some users could behave
selfishly to protect their cost privacy, sensing preferences’ privacy and identification
privacy, thereby violating the hypothesis and making these well-designedmechanisms
inefficient. On the other hand, the platform need to keep the set of current winners
secrecy to maximize his utility when facing the adversarial users. Thus, it is impera-
tive to provide some measures to eliminate the privacy-leakage concerns of users and
platform so as to achieve good service quality.
In addition to the privacy issue, the payments’ verifiability issue is also a crucial
human factor for the wide acceptance of the above crowd sensing applications. It is
because that some controller of the platform (the crowd sensing organizer) may mis-
behave, e.g., provide false results or insert a fictitious bid and sensing preference just
below the payment to the users so as to deceitfully decrease the payment to users
[Parkes et al. 2008; Dong et al. 2011]. If the correctness of the payments from the plat-
form is not well guaranteed, users will be reluctant to participate in crowd sensing ap-
plications. In practice, since a real-world platform is operated by an individual within
a large corporation, or by a public servant within a government department, the pos-
sibility of incorrect operations from the platform exists in crowd sensing applications.
For example, the World Bank recently estimated the volume of incorrect exchanging
hands for public sector procurement alone to roughly US$200 billion per year, with
the annual volume of the procurement projects tainted by incorrect operations close
to US$1.5 trillion. Thus, how to deal with the payments’ verifiability is crucial for the
success of crowd sensing applications.
Although both privacy and verifiability issues have been identified as two cru-
cial human factors for the wide acceptance of crowd sensing applications, many re-
cent research works [Huang et al. 2013; Jung et al. 2013a; Angel and Walfish 2013;
Catane and Herzberg 2013] tend to separately study them in crowd sensing applica-
tions. The reason is that, if the privacy and verifiability issues are addressed at the
same time in crowd sensing applications, the problem would become more challeng-
ing. For example, some privacy enhanced techniques [Ganti et al. 2008; Shi et al. 2010]
enable a user to hide his identity and sensing profile (i.e., cost and sensing prefer-
ences like locations), but they could make some verifiable strategies, especially the
non-truthfulness incentive strategies, hard to implement in the above truthful incen-
tive mechanisms, since the platform needs to greedily select winners and compute the
threshold payment based on the examination of a user’s sensing profile. However, the
improvement of the verifiability needs to reveal more information, thereby reducing
privacy of users and platform. Therefore, how to simultaneously address privacy and
verifiability issues becomes particularly challenging in crowd sensing applications.
To tackle the above-mentioned challenges, in this paper, we present a first step to-
wards a crowd sensing system in which users can verify the payments from the plat-
form without revealing any additional information by using the order preserving en-
cryption scheme (OPES) [Agrawal et al. 2004]. Our approach is to enable users to ver-
ify the payments with the help of an auction issuer (AI): The AI chooses winners and
greedily computes the threshold payment based on encrypted user’s sensing profiles.
Since these encrypted sensing profiles are order-preserving, the threshold payment is
the same as the one produced by the platform, thereby solving the verifiability with-
out reducing privacy of users and platform. Specifically speaking, we first introduce
three incentive mechanisms for crowd sensing applications with homogeneous sens-
ing jobs, heterogeneous sensing jobs and submodular sensing jobs (to be elaborated
later). Then, we propose a general privacy preservation verifiable incentive mechanism
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for homogeneous sensing jobs and heterogeneous sensing jobs. Furthermore, we also
propose a privacy preservation verifiable incentive mechanism for submodular sens-
ing jobs. The two mechanisms are implemented by introducing the oblivious transfer
(OT), the timed lapse cryptography services (TLC), and the bulletin board, satisfying
the three desirable properties: the non-repudiation by users and the platform, secrecy,
and verifiable correctness. Finally, analysis show that our privacy-preserving verifi-
able incentive mechanisms achieve the same results as the generic one without privacy
preservation and verification.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly discuss the re-
lated work and motivation. In Section 3, we present our relative models and our design
goal. In Section 4, we introduce novel incentive mechanisms for crowd sensing applica-
tions with the budget constraint. Based on these mechanisms, in Section 5, we design
two privacy-preserving verifiable incentive mechanisms satisfying the above three de-
sirable properties, followed by the security analysis and performance evaluation in
Section 6 and Section 7. Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section 8.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Privacy-preserving mechanisms have been extensively explored in crowd sensing
applications. Most of these research works are based on k-anonymity [Sweeney 2002],
where a user’s location is cloaked among k − 1 other users. For instance, the au-
thors of [Kalnis et al. 2007] and [Gedik and Liu 2008] use the temporal and spatial
cloaking techniques to preserve users’ privacy. Their mechanisms blind the partici-
pant’s location at a specific time in a cloaked area to achieve the privacy requirements.
The authors of [Shilton et al. 2008; Shin et al. 2011; De Cristofaro and Soriente 2011]
study the privacy protection in crowd sensing applications by applying a pri-
vacy regulation technique. Furthermore, the authors of [Shin et al. 2011] and
[De Cristofaro and Soriente 2011] focus on how users submit the jobs to the platform
without disclosing their identity. Different from the above anonymous collection mech-
anisms, the authors of [Huang et al. 2013] protect the privacy of users by applying the
OT [Rabin 1981]. However, they do not consider the verifiability of user’s inputs and
outcomes.
Additionally, verifiability of the payment is also a vital factor an incentive mech-
anism design faced. The verifiability of payments have been extensively explored
in traditional auction mechanisms. For instance, the authors of [Naor et al. 1999;
Juels and Szydlo 2003] apply the proxy OT to verify the payment of the platform by
constructing a circuit. The authors of [Parkes et al. 2008] use a timed lapse cryptog-
raphy service to keep users’ bids secret from the platform before the auction closed,
and prevent them from rigging their bids after bidding. However, they do not ap-
ply for crowd sensing applications, since they neglect the effect of a large of partici-
pants in crowd sensing applications. Recently, a timed commitment encryption method
is adopted to enhance the level of the payment correctness from the platform for
crowd sensing applications. For example, the authors of [Catane and Herzberg 2013;
Zhao et al. 2012; Angel and Walfish 2013] apply the timed commitment to tackle the
verifiable correctness issue in different aspects. However, these mechanisms are not
applicable in real crowd sensing applications with the budget constraint.
In this paper, to solve the above challenges, we introduce the bulletin board, OT, and
TLC to guarantee the privacy and verifiability for crowd sensing applications without
sacrificing the platform’s utility and truthfulness.
3. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
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In this section, we first expound our systemmodel, auctionmodel, adversarial model,
and the bulletin board applied to our privacy-preserving verifiable incentive mecha-
nisms. Then we present our goal for crowd sensing applications.
3.1. System Model
We consider the following system model for crowd sensing applications, illustrated in
Fig. 1. The system consists of a crowd sensing platform that resides in the cloud, a
requester, and many mobile device users that are connected to the platform by cellular
networks (e.g., GSM/3G/4G) or WiFi connections. The requester posts a crowd sensing
task with a budget B > 0 to the platform. There are m available assignments in each
task. Receiving the task, the platform publicizes a crowd sensing campaign towards
the area of interest (AoI), aiming at finding some users to maximize the number of
assignments performed efficiently. Assuming that a set of users U = {1, 2, · · · , n} in the
AoI is interested in the campaign. In this paper, with respect to the model of sensing
jobs completed by all users, we discuss the following three sensing job models proposed
in [Singer 2010] for the crowd sensing campaign:
Homogeneous sensing job model: Both each sensing job assignment and the
limit of the number of assignments completed by each user are the same. Meanwhile,
each user can complete only a single assignment.
Heterogeneous sensing job model: Each sensing job assignment is the same, but
the limit of the number of assignments completed by each user is different. It means
that different users can complete different number of assignments.
Submodular sensing job model: Each sensing job assignment is different, and
each user i can do a subset Γi of assignments Γ.
If the campaign is oriented to users with the homogeneous sensing job model and the
heterogeneous sensing job model, receiving the campaign, each user i synchronously
submits his sensing profile Pi = (bi, li), where bi is obtained based on a true cost ci
for performing a single assignment and li is a limit for the number of assignments
he is willing to work on. This means that if he is a winner, at most li assignments
can be allocated to him and the payment for each assignment must exceed bi. In this
case, the sensing job model is the heterogeneous sensing job model, which indicates
that different users can complete different number of assignments. When li = 1, the
sensing job model is reduced to the homogeneous sensing job model, which indicates
that each user can complete only a single assignment.
If the campaign is oriented to users with the submodular sensing job model, receiv-
ing the campaign, each user i synchronously submits his sensing profile Pi = (bi,Γi),
where bi is obtained based on a true cost ci for performing the sensing service with
his assignments’ set Γi, i.e., Γi ⊆ Γ = {τ1, τ2, · · · , τm}. We assume that li or Γi is fixed.
Furthermore, under the budget constraint B, the platform, when presented with the
sensing profiles of all users, must decide a subset of users to select, and how much pay-
ment to pay to each selected user. Our goal is to make incentive mechanisms to achieve
non-repudiation by users and platform, secrecy, and verification without sacrificing the
above standard economic goal such as utility maximization, truthfulness.
3.2. Auction Model
We model the above interactive process as a sealed-bid auction between the platform
and users (see Fig. 2), in which there is a crowd sensing platform, a set of participatory
users, and an AI. A set of assignments Γ publicized by the platform during the deadline
T are auctioned towards n users in crowd sensing applications. Each user i submits his
encrypted sensing profile Pi, i.e., a pair of encrypted bi and encrypted li or Γi. The AI
is semi-honest (passive or curious), and only checks the platform randomly. This will
be further illustrated in Section 4.
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Fig. 1. Our crowd sensing system model.
Area of Interest
Platform
Users
AI
Fig. 2. Our general crowd sensing auction scenario.
3.3. Bulletin Board
The platform maintains a bulletin board. It can be a publicly known website main-
tained and updated by the platform. The platform applies the bulletin board to post
all public information about the mechanism, including all abstractions (e.g., some auc-
tion details) as well as encrypted information about users’ profiles, the methods of the
winner selection and payment determination that can be used to verify the payment
correctness from the platform. All posted to the bulletin board will carry appropriate
digital signatures so as to identify their originators. For the ease of exposition, we will
refer to signi(m) as the signature of the message m from the user i in the rest of this
paper. All abstractions can be constructed by using standard cryptographic techniques.
We calculate the communication overheads of our mechanisms as the number of auc-
tion details published on the bulletin board. It is worth noting that a robust bulletin
board is needed for crowd sensing applications. Thus our mechanisms can just exploit
standard broadcast techniques.
3.4. Adversarial Model
In the auction process with the budget constraint, the platform is supposed to know
only the set of current winners, and their sensing profiles. Each user i only learns
whether he is the winner, and he is paid if he is a winner. He does not know anything
about others’ profiles except for the very limited implicit information in the payment
from the platform.
We assume that the platform and users are semi-honest adversaries in our mech-
anisms, and collusion of bidders and platform does not exist. That is, the platform is
interested in inferring each user’s private information no matter he is a winner or not.
Users try to infer others’ sensing profiles to maximize their own utilities. Besides, the
platform and users can also collude with each other. According to the above auction
model, we give the analysis of the privacy in our framework below.
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Definition 1. Given all the communication strings C and its output of the auction
Output during the auction, an adversary’s advantage over the privacy information ζi of
user i is defined asAdvζi = Pr[ζi|C, Output]−Pr[ζi|Output], where Pr[ζi] is the probability
that a correct ζi is inferred. In this paper, ζi can be the bid or sensing services Γi of user
i.
Definition 2. A privacy-preserving scheme satisfies k-anonymity, if a user can-
not be identified by the sensitive information with probability higher than 1/k
[Sweeney 2002].
In this paper, our security goal is to achieve a scheme such that the advantage is of
a negligible function of the security parameter or k-anonymity is guaranteed.
3.5. Problem Formulation
According to the above sensing job model, we need to consider two cases. One case
is when sensing job model is the homogeneous sensing job model or the heteroge-
neous sensing job model. In the two models, the platform needs to design a mechanism
M = (f, p), which consists of an allocation function f : Rn+ → Z
[n]
+ and a payment
function p : Rn+ → R
n
+. The allocation function f maps a set of n bids to an allocation
of assignments for a selected subset of users. In particular, in the homogeneous sens-
ing job model, if user i is selected, fi = 1. The payment function p returns a vector
(p1, · · · , pn) of payments to the users. That is, each selected user i ∈ S is allocated fi
assignments at price pi per task. In the heterogeneous user model, the utility of user i
is fi(pi − ci) if it is selected, i.e., i ∈ S, 0 otherwise. The existing goal of the platform is
to maximize the number of assignments under given budget B, i.e., max
∑
i∈S fi, sub-
ject to
∑
i∈S fipi ≤ B, ∀i, fi ≤ li. In particular, when li = 1, the above results are also
applicable to the homogeneous sensing job model.
The other case is when sensing job model is the submodular sensing job model. The
platform needs to design a mechanism M = (f, p), which consists of an allocation
function f : Rn+ → 2
[n] and a payment function p : Rn+ →R
n
+. The allocation function f
is a indicator function that returns 1 if user i is allocated and 0 otherwise. The utility
of user i is pi−ci if it is selected, i.e., i ∈ S, 0 otherwise. The payment function p returns
a vector (p1, · · · , pn) of payments to the users. The existing goal of the platform is to
maximize the value from the selected users’ services under the budget constraint B,
i.e., maxV (S), subject to
∑
i∈S pi ≤ B, where V (S) is monotone submodular.
However, the above maximal problem will bring many security and privacy issues
including users’ sensing profiles. Since users are reluctant to disclose all these private
information to others as well as the platform. On the other hand, both the winners
and the platform should be able to verify the payment provided by our mechanisms.
Thus, beyond the standard economic goals (e.g., truthfulness, individual rationality,
utility maximization, etc.), our mechanisms also satisfy the following three desirable
properties:
—Non-repudiation by users and platform: For each user, once it submits a en-
crypted profile, its encrypted profile is provably unalterable. For the platform, its
exclusion of a properly submitted encrypted profile can be conclusively proven. Thus,
it must action legally.
—Secrecy: These encrypted profiles are bidden to all users and the platform until
their holders become winners of mechanisms. When they become winners, only the
platform knows their decrypted profiles. When they become losers, their encrypted
profiles are bidden to all other users and the platform. The current winners’ profiles
of the platform are bidden to all users no matter whether these users are winners or
not.
, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January 2014.
Privacy-Preserving Verifiable Incentive Mechanisms for Crowd Sensing Applications A:7
—Verifiable correctness: Since the mechanism itself is truthful, we only need to
guarantee that each user can verify the payment correct provided from the platform
by applying the computation method published on the bulletin board.
4. INCENTIVE MECHANISMS FOR CROWD SENSING APPLICATIONS
In this section, we introduce three incentive mechanisms for crowd sensing applica-
tions with homogeneous sensing jobs, heterogeneous sensing jobs, submodular sensing
jobs respectively. In essence, the incentive mechanisms for crowd sensing applications
require the truthfulness, computationally effectiveness, budget feasibility and approx-
imation. Singer et al. present these mechanisms meeting the four conditions well. For
the ease of presentation, in the following section, we propose two privacy preservation
verifiable incentive mechanisms based on the three mechanisms, but our mechanisms
are easy to be extended to other truthful incentive mechanisms for real crowd sensing
environments. Furthermore, their truthful mechanisms are illustrated as follows.
To better understand the following three incentive mechanisms, let us see the fol-
lowing familiar example. Given a budget constraint B and subsets U = {1, 2, · · · , n} of
some ground set, where each user i corresponds to a subset of the ground set and a
associated cost ci find a users’ subset S which maximizes | ∪i∈S {i}| under the budget
constraint. This is a typical coverage problem, called submodular sensing job model
here, in which each user’s value depends on the identity of the sensing data set it
holds. When each user’s value only depends on the cardinality of the sensing data set,
rather than the identity of the sensing data set it holds, it means that different users
can complete different number of sensing data, thereby simplifying the submodular
sensing job model to heterogeneous sensing job model. Furthermore, if each user only
completes a single sensing data assignment, the heterogeneous sensing job model will
become a homogeneous sensing job model. For the simplicity of presentation, we first
introduce the incentive mechanism with homogeneous sensing job model.
4.1. Incentive Mechanism with Homogeneous Sensing Jobs
For crowd sensing applications with homogeneous sensing jobs, consider the above-
mentioned allocation rule f : Sort the n bids reported by n users so that b1 ≤ b2 ≤ · · · ≤
bn, and find the largest k so that bk ≤ B/k. That is, k is the place where the curve of
the increasing costs intersects the hyperbolaB/k.The set allocated here is {1, 2, · · · , k}.
That is, winners’ set S = {1, 2, · · · , k}. This is obviously a monotone allocation rule: a
user can be not excluded when decreasing his bid. In [Singer 2010], the authors design
the following incentive mechanism for crowd sensing applications with homogeneous
sensing jobs and show the mechanism satisfies the above four conditions.
More formally, firstly, sorting the users’ bids: satisfying b1 ≤ b2 ≤ · · · ≤ bn. Then find
the largest integer k such that bk ≤ B/k. Finally, determine the set of allocated users
to be S = {1, 2, · · · , k}, and provide same payment pi = min{B/k, bk+1}.
4.2. Incentive Mechanism with Heterogeneous Sensing Jobs
For crowd sensing applications with heterogeneous sensing jobs, the authors of
[Singer and Mittal 2013] present the following mechanism for determining near-
optimal prices of jobs for crowd sensing applications with heterogeneous sensing jobs.
Their mechanism is illustrated as follows: Firstly, sort the users’ bids: satisfying
b1 ≤ b2 ≤ · · · ≤ bn. Then find the largest integer k such that bi ≤ B/
∑
j≤i fj. Finally,
determine the set of allocated users S = {1, 2, · · · , k}, and provide the same payment
min{B/
∑
j≤i fj, bi+1/li+1} for completing a sensing job.
Obviously, the homogeneous user model is a special case of the heterogeneous user
model, i.e., li = 1 for each user i.
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4.3. Incentive Mechanism with Submodular Sensing Jobs
For crowd sensing applications with submodular sensing jobs, the authors of
[Singer 2010; Tran-Thanh et al. 2012; Yang et al. 2012] apply the proportional share
allocation rule proposed in [Singer 2010] to address the extensive user participation
issue for crowd sensing applications, which consists of two phases: the winner selec-
tion phase and the payment determination phase. We first introduce definition of the
submodular utility function.
ALGORITHM 1: An auction mechanism for submodular sensing jobs under the budget con-
straint
Input: User set U , the budget constraint B.
Output: The set of winners S.
1: // Phase 1: Winner selection
2: S ← ∅; i← argmaxj∈U Uj(S)/bj ;
3: while Ui(S)/bi ≥ U(S ∪ i)/B do
4: S ← S ∪ i;
5: i← argmaxj∈U\S(Uj(S)/bj);
6: end while
7: // Phase 2: Payment determination
8: for each user i ∈ U do
9: pi ← 0;
10: end for
11: for each user i ∈ S do
12: U
′
← U\{i}; T ← ∅;
13: repeat
14: ij ← argmaxj∈U′\T (Uj(T )/bj);
15: pi ← max{pi,min{bi(j), ηi(j)}};
16: Tj−1 ← T ; T ← T ∪ {ij};
17: until bij > Ui(j)(Tj−1)B/U(T )
18: end for
19: return (S, p);
Definition 3 (SUBMODULAR FUNCTION). Let N be a finite set, a function U :
2Ω → R is submodular if U(S ∪ {i})− U(S) ≥ U(T ∪ {i})− U(T ), ∀S ⊆ T ⊆ Ω, where R
is the set of reals.
From the above Definition 3, we can know the utility function U is submodular and
derive the following sorting according to increasing marginal contributions relative to
their bids from users’ set to find the largest k satisfying bk ≤ UkB/U(S ∪ k).
U1/b1 ≥ U2/b2 ≥ · · · ≥ U|U|/b|U|, (1)
where Uk denotes Uk|Sk−1 (= U(Sk−1 ∪ {k}) − U(Sk−1)), Sk = {1, 2, · · · , k}, and S0 = ∅.
To calculate the payment of each user, we sort the users in U\{i} similarly as follows:
Ui1(T0)/bi1 ≥ Ui2(T1)/bi2 ≥ · · · ≥ Uin−1(Tn−2)/bin−1 , (2)
The marginal value of user i at the position j isBUi(j)(Tj−1)/U(Tj). Assume that k
′
to
be the position of the last user ij ∈ U\{i}, such that bij ≤ Ui(j)(Tj−1)B/U(T ). To guar-
antee the truthfulness, each winner should be given the payment of the critical value.
This indicates that user i can not win the auction if it reports higher than this critical
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value. More details are given in Algorithm 1, where bi(j) = Ui(j)(Tj−1)bij/Uij (Tj−1) and
ηi(j) = Ui(j)(Tj−1)B/U(Tj−1 ∪ {i}).
However, although the above three mechanisms under the given budget constraint
are so promising for crowd sensing applications, it also bring many verifiability and
privacy issues including users’ sensing profiles and the payment correctness. In the
following section, we will design two privacy-preserving verifiable incentive mecha-
nisms for crowd sensing applications with homogeneous and heterogeneous sensing
jobs, and submodular sensing jobs to address the above-mentioned challenges.
5. DESIGN DETAILS
During the above three auction mechanisms for crowd sensing applications with ho-
mogeneous, heterogeneous jobs and submodular jobs, we need to choose a set of win-
ners and finish the payment of the winners according to the mechanism with the given
budget constraint. In this section, we first introduce basic cryptographic schemes. Then
we apply the schemes to design our privacy preservation verifiable auction mechanism
for homogeneous, heterogeneous jobs and submodular jobs respectively.
5.1. Basic Cryptographic Schemes
In this section, we introduce the constructions of time-lapse cryptography service and
blinded digital signature for achieving the goal of non-repudiation by users and plat-
form, OT for making users’ sensing profile secret, and the computation of marginal
utility and set union for making platform’ current winners’ set secret. Then, in the fol-
lowing details, we apply the bulletin board and the parameter α to ensure verifiability
of payments and the payment correctness.
5.1.1. Time-Lapse Cryptography Service. In our proposed mechanism we apply timed
commitments on sensing profiles of all users until the auction closes. Cryptographic
methods, as presented in [Boneh and Naor 2000] can be used to implement the timed-
commitments. Considering the computation efficiency reasons, we choose a time lapse
cryptography (TLC) service from [Rabin and Thorpe 2006], which makes it possible to
use commitments with the classical hiding and binding properties. Besides, it prevents
users from refusing to reveal committed sensing profiles and also preventing the plat-
form from dropping received commitments, claiming not to have been able to reveal
the committed sensing profiles. In our mechanisms, an auction issuer (AI), acting as
the TLC service provider, publishes a public key of a non-malleable encryption scheme,
and sends the corresponding private key only when the auction closes. Whenever timed
commitments on sensing profiles are applied, it means that a user encrypts her sens-
ing profile by applying the AI-generated public encryption key. Besides, receiving the
corresponding private key, the platform can know the encrypted sensing profile.
5.1.2. Blinded Digital Signature. In our work, each user is a signer who is introduced only
to keep the confidentiality of its the following transformed bid and sensing subset of
assignments to the platform as well as other users. Considering the security, not all
digital signature schemes can be used. To these goals, we apply the Nyberg-Rueppel
signature scheme [Camenisch et al. 1995] (see Algorithm 2). Notably, we do not need
the signer to verify the authenticity of them, and on the other hand the platform can
obtain their transformed bids and sensing preference selections from all signers. For
the ease of exposition, we will refer to signi(m) as the signature of the message m
from the user i in the rest of this paper. Note that the signature scheme requires the
message to be an integer, therefore, we need to apply sign(⌊10km⌋) for the input m
if m is not an integer like the bid, where k can be appropriately chosen to preserve
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the rank from {3, 4, · · · } and ψ(x) denotes the output of the signature scheme. At the
same time, we remove the signature by using 10−ksign−1(cm), where cm is obtained
by the signature cm = signi(m). For ease of exposition, in the rest of the paper, we
assume that the value of the signature is an integer. According to [Jung et al. 2013a],
the deviation for the roundness of the signature is negligible. Thus, our assumption is
reasonable.
ALGORITHM 2: Blinded Nyberg-Rueppel Signature.
1: Initialize a prime number p, a prime factor q of p− 1, and an element g ∈ Z∗p with order q;
2: The signer selects k˜ ∈ Zp and sends r˜ = g
k˜(mod p) to signee;
3: The signee randomly chooses α ∈ Zq, β ∈ Z
∗
q , computes r = mg
α(mod p) and m˜ = rβ−1(mod
q) until m˜ ∈ Z∗q . Then, he sends m˜ to the signer;
4: The signer computes s˜ = m˜x+ k˜(mod q) and sends s˜ to the signee;
5: The signee computes s˜ = s˜β + α(mod q), and the pair (r, s) is the the signature for m;
6: Check whether m = g−syrr(mod q) to verify the correctness.
5.1.3. OT for Privacy Preservation. OT is a paradigm of secret exchange between two
parties, users and a platform. Each user can achieve one of n secrets from the user,
without knowing any information about the rest of n secrets, while the platform has
no idea which of the n secrets is accessed. Our work employs an efficient 1-out-of-z OT
of integers [Tzeng 2004]. The detailed description is given in the Algorithm 3.
ALGORITHM 3: Oblivious Transfer (OT 1n ).
1: Initialization: System parameters: (g, h,Gg); the AI’s input:m1,m2, · · · ,mn ∈ Gg ; user i’s
choice: α, 1 ≤ α ≤ n;
2: User i sends y = grhα;
3: The AI replies with ci = (g
ki ,mi(y/h
i)ki), ki ∈R Zq , 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
4: By cα = (a, b), user i computes mα = b/a
r;
5.1.4. Marginal Utility Computation. Besides the above losers’ sensing preferences, the
current winner set S produced by the platform, should be also kept secret to all
users. In such problems, how to compute the marginal utility without knowing S is
challenging. We address it by introducing multivariate polynomial evaluation pro-
tocol (MPEP)[Jung et al. 2013b; Zhang et al. 2013], in which the multivariate poly-
nomial are computed without disclosing any xi input of various users as follows:
f(~x) =
∑m
k=1 (ck
n∏
i=1
x
di,k
i ), where there is a group of open m powers for each user and
m coefficients to any participant as well as the attackers. We compute the marginal
utility by assuming that there are m sensing data points and n mobile users. Then we
have m-dimensional vector CS indicating whether m sensing data points are included
in currently chosen sets S, where ck,S = 1−
∏n
j=1 (1− cj,k,S). If k-th data point is in user
j’s subset Γj of assignments and user j is in S, ck,S = 1, and 0 otherwise. Since each
user knows whether it belongs to S, each winning user’s marginal utility can be eval-
uated via one aggregator MPEP with the help of n users and only user i receives the
result by applying the above MPEP equation. Finally, the user i can divide his bid bi
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to the result to compute the marginal-utility-per-bid value ωi. The detailed expression
is given as follows:
ωi =
1
bi
(
∑m
j=1
cj,S∪{i} −
∑m
j=1
cj,S)
=
1
bi
(
∑m
k=1
(1−
∏n
j=1
(1 − cj,k,S∪{i}))−
∑m
k=1
(1−
∏n
j=1
(1− cj,k,S))).
5.1.5. Privacy Preservation Set Union Computation for Platform. Since the current winner set
S is required to be kept secret to all users, for the platform, how to compute the set
union without leakage the its privacy, i.e., the current winner set S is a challenging
issue. In the paper, we address it by using Paillier cryptosystem [Paillier 1999] to the
set union computation. About the set union computation, we refer interested readers
to the paper [Frikken 2007]. The detailed description is illustrated in Algorithm 4. The
Paillier cryptosystem as well as its homomorphic property is also shown below:
E(m1, r1) · E(m2, r2) = E(m1 +m2, r1 + r2)
E(m1) · gm2 = E(m1 +m2, r1)
E(m1, r1)
m2 = E(m1 ·m2, r1 ·m2)
(3)
ALGORITHM 4: Privacy-preserving set union computation.
1: Initialize system parameter: two same-length prime numbers p,q, public keys n = pq,
g ∈ Z∗n2 , private key λ = (p− 1)(q − 1), µ = λ
−1mod n;
2: The platform computes the polynomial fA and sends the encrypted Ep(fS) to the user ui;
3: Upon receiving Ep(fS), the user ui chooses a random value r (choose uniformly) and
computes a tuple (Ep(fS(τ ) ∗ τ ∗ r), Ep(fS(τ ) ∗ r)) for each assignment value τ ∈ S. He
randomly permutes all of the tuples and sends them to the platform;
4: For each tuple (Ep(x), Ep(y)), the platform decrypts x and y. If both values are 0, then the
platform continues to next tuple. Otherwise, the platform finds a good with the value x ∗ y−1
and adds it to the output set; As such, the marginal utility of the user ui can be obtained.
5.2. Design Privacy-Preserving Details for Homogeneous and Heterogeneous jobs
5.2.1. Initialization. The platform invites the AI to participate in the auction and sends
the following information to him: the crowd sensing task identifier TID of the plat-
form, the deadline T , and the timed-lapse encryption key TPK to be used by all users
in commitments. If the AI accepts them, he sets the probability of the auditions from
users as α so that α ≥ pmax/(F + pmax), where pmax and F are the maximal payment
and fine paid from the platform respectively, and sends signed α and signed auction de-
tails to the platform. If the platform accepts it, the platform posts them on the bulletin
board. Finally, our mechanism also defines a set of possible bids as β = {β1, β2, · · · , βz}
and a set of possible limits of the number of assignments, χ = {χ1, χ2, · · · , χv}, where
β1 < β2 < · · · < βz and χ1 < χ2 < · · · < χv hold, and requires each user i’s bid bi ∈ β
and the limit of the number of assignments li ∈ χ. The AI maps each bid value βi
and limit value χi to γi and τi respectively, while preserving the rank, i.e., satisfying
γ1 < γ2 < · · · < γn and τ1 < τ2 < · · · < τn. Similarly, users’ bids and limits are trans-
formed by using the OPES for preserving their ranks. To this end, we assume that the
above AI can bootstrap the crowd sensing market application. All of the above data are
posted on the bulletin board, accompanied by the platform’s signature signp.
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ALGORITHM 5: PVI-H// Privacy-preserving Verifiable incentive mechanism for Crowd sensing
applications with homogeneous sensing jobs or Heterogeneous sensing jobs
Input: User set U , the budget constraint B.
Output: S.
// Phase 1: Winner selection
1: Initialize: Each user i receives his encrypted sensing profile (b˜i, t˜i) by using Algorithm 3
and submits their commitments to the platform; At time T + 1, the platform makes a
decommitment and sorts users in U i.e., b˜1 < b˜2 · · · < b˜|U|;S ← ∅; i = 1;
2: b1 ← OPENS
−1(b˜1);
3: while bi ≤ B/
∑
j∈S fj do
4: fi ← 1;
5: if jobs are heterogeneous then
6: fi ← min{OPENS
−1(l˜i), τi}, where τi = ⌊(B − bi
∑
j∈S fj)/bi⌋;
7: end if
8: S ← S ∪ i;
9: i← i+ 1;
10: bi ← OPENS
−1(b˜i);
11: end while
// Phase 2: Payment determination
12: for each user i ∈ S do
13: li+1 ← OPENS
−1(l˜i+1);
14: if j ≤ i− 1 then
15: Pay pjfj to user j;
16: end if
17: if j == i then
18: pj ← min{B/
∑
j∈S fj , bi+1/li+1}; Pay pjfj to user j;
19: end if
20: end for
21: return S;
5.2.2. Commitment. Each user i chooses a bid bi and a limit li of the number of as-
signments to form his sensing profile, and then interacts with the AI. According to
the Algorithm 3, each user i receives b˜i = γx and his limit l˜i = τx, which are the
rank-preserving-encrypted values of βx and χx respectively, thereby forming his en-
crypted sensing profile. Then each user i encrypts the encrypted sensing profile as
ei = EKppub(b˜i|l˜i|ri) by using the platform’s Paillier encryption key Kppub and a ran-
domly chosen values ri. User i then makes a commitment ci = ETPK(ei|si|TID), where
si is a randomly generated bit string for the proof of correctness and TID is the auc-
tion identifier ID. Finally, the user signs this commitment, and sends a bidding request
BR = (signi(ci|TID)) to platform, if used, before time T (see Fig. 5, step 1©). The plat-
form returns a signed receipt Ri = signp(ci|TID|T ) (see Fig. 5, step 2©). At time T , the
platform posts all the received true commitments c1, c2, · · · , cn on the bulletin board.
Note that hiding of the encrypted bids and of the random strings by applying the sec-
ondary encryption prevents anyone from learning any knowledge of the data prior to
time T . In particular, neither the AI nor the platform has any meaningful information.
Furthermore, between time T and T + 1, for any user who has a receipt for a bid
which is not posted (see Fig. 5, step 3©), he can appeal his non-inclusion, resorting to
the AI.
5.2.3. Decommitment. At time T + 1, each party, including the platform and all users,
can recover each encrypted sensing profile ei as well as each random string ri by em-
ploying the decryption key TSK posted by the AI. The platform recovers the pair for
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Fig. 3. Our privacy-preserving verifiable framework for homogeneous and heterogeneous jobs.
computing the auction’s results and random values r1, · · · , rk for the verification of
correctness by applying the platform decryption key. The platform then computes the
set of winners and their corresponding payments from the platform according to the
above auction mechanism with the given budget constraint. The platform posts the
winner’s identity and the encrypted payment information so that any party can verify
the correct results on the bulletin board.
(a)Winners Selection: In this stage, our goal of the winners’ selection is to find the
biggest integer k so that bk ≤ B/
∑k
i=1 fi holds, thereby obtaining the set of winners.
Firstly, the platform first recovers the bids b˜i from the bulletin board and then sorts all
users’ encrypted bids from all users and resorts to the AI to fetch the original value b1
of b˜1: b1 = OPENS
−1(b˜1). If bi ≤ B/
∑
j≤i fj holds, then users with the rank 1, 2, · · · , i
are winners, thus, for the platform, privacy leakage does not exist. Otherwise, the
largest number k = i − 1. When user i is added to the set of winners, the platform
then computes his assignments f˜i ← min{OPENS−1(l˜i), τ˜i}. The iteration is repeated
until our goal is achieved. The set of winners {1, 2, · · · , k} is found. Notable, when we
determine the largest k, if bi ≤ B/
∑
j≤i fj does not hold, the k + 1-th user’s bids and
assignments, i.e., its sensing profile, may be disclosed (see Fig. 5, step 4©). Since in our
crowd sensing applications, we assume that the number of users is much larger than
the number k. As such, our scheme satisfies k-anonymity. So, neither the AI, nor the
platform, can identify any user’s sensing profile with the probability higher than 1/k.
The detailed description is given in the Algorithm 5.
(b)Payment Decision: In the payment determination phase, the platform pays pjfj
to user j for j ≤ i. Similarly, for each winner i ∈ S, the payment of per sensing job,
i.e., pi, is given in Algorithm 5. In particular, our payment scheme is applicable to
homogeneous and heterogeneous sensing job models (see Fig. 5, step 5©).
5.2.4. Verification. Since the above incentive mechanism guarantees the truthfulness
for users, we only need to verify the payment correctness of the platform, that is, any of
the users can verify the outcome of the auction on his own. The detailed descriptions
are given as follows. Firstly, user i requests AI to verify the payment outcome with
the probability α. After the AI receives the request, he asks for the random value ri
of each user’s ei. Then he derives each user ei’s b˜i, l˜i by decrypting ei on the bulletin
board with ri, thereby obtaining the payment according to the above auction details
and the information from the bulletin board. He sends the encrypted payment fipi
and his assignments f
′
i to the user i to verify the correctness of the outcomes from
the platform,thereby obtaining the user’s feedback to determine whether to fine the
platform (see Fig. 4). Analysis in the following section shows that the platform operates
correctly and does not try to cheat.
, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January 2014.
A:14 J. Sun
AIUsers
Commitment Round
Decommitment Round
Initialization Parameters
Verification Request
signAI([TID|pi])
Verification OutcomeVerify
Fine
Fig. 4. Our verifiable phase for homogeneous and heterogeneous jobs.
5.3. Design Privacy-Preserving Details for Submodular Sensing Jobs
Different from the above mechanism, for the submodular sensing job model, we need
overcome the challenge of protecting platform’s privacy, i.e., the privacy of the current
winners’ set, by using the above-mentioned MPEP method and homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme. The detailed descriptions are described below.
5.3.1. Initialization. The platform invites the AI to participate in the auction and sends
the following information to him: the crowd sensing task identifier TID of the plat-
form, the description of the mechanism, the deadline T , and the timed-lapse encryp-
tion key TPK to be used by all users in commitments. If the AI accepts them, it sets
the probability of the auditions from the users as α so that α ≥ pmax/(F +pmax), where
pmax and F are the maximal payment and fine paid from the platform respectively,
and sends signed α and signed auction details to the platform. If the platform accepts
it, the platform posts them on the bulletin board. Our mechanism also defines a set of
possible marginal utilities per bid as β = {β1, β2, · · · , βz}, where β1 < β2 < · · · < βz
holds, and requires that each user i’s marginal utility per bid ωi ∈ β. The AI maps
each βi to γi, while preserving the rank, i.e., satisfying γ1 < γ2 < · · · < γn. Similarly,
each user’s marginal utility per bid is transformed by using the order preserving en-
cryption scheme (OPES) [Agrawal et al. 2004] for preserving their ranks. To this end,
we assume that the above AI can bootstrap the crowd sensing application. Then it con-
structs three dynamic lists for the verification of payments’ correctness initiated by
each user. The first list lwi for user i is used to put his marginal utility per bid ωi(S)
for the winner determination phase. The second list lpi is used to put his marginal
utility per bid ωi(T ) for the payment determination phase. The last dynamic list l
S
i is
constructed for each winner. All of the above data are posted on the bulletin board,
accompanied by the platform’s signature signp.
5.3.2. Commitment Round for Winner and Payment Determination. Each user i initially
chooses a bid bi and a subset Γi of assignments according to his valuation he pref-
erences. Each user i initially computes his marginal utility Ui(∅), thereby obtaining
his marginal utility per bid ωi(∅). Then he interacts with the AI by using the Algo-
rithm 3, thereby receiving ω˜i,0(∅), where the subscript 0 denotes the cardinality of the
current winners’ set is equal to 0, and ω˜i,0(∅) is the rank-preserving-encrypted value
of βx. Then each user i encrypts it as ei = E(ω˜i,0|ri) by using the platform’s Paillier
encryption key Kpub and a randomly chosen value ri. User i then makes a commit
ci = ETPK([ei|si|TID]), where si is a randomly generated bit string for the proof of
correctness and TID is the auction identifier ID. Finally, user i signs this commit-
ment ci and the encrypted value ei. Then he adds signi(ci) to the list l
w
i on the bul-
letin board and sends signi(ei) to platform. Receiving all users’ values signi(ei), the
platform decrypts and sorts them, thereby obtaining the user i with the maximal en-
crypted marginal utility per bid. Moreover, the platform enters the following winner
determination phase.
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Fig. 5. Our privacy-preserving verifiable framework for submodular jobs.
(a)Winner Determination: Firstly, the platform applies the homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme to compute the utility U(S ∪ {i}) according to Algorithm 4, thereby
obtaining ωp,0 = U(S ∪ {i})/B. By using the Algorithm 3, the platform interacts
with the AI, and receives the encrypted ω˜p,0. The platform makes a commit cp,0 =
ETPK([ω˜p,0|sp|TID]), where sp is a randomly generated bit string for the proof of cor-
rectness and TID is the auction identifier ID. Signing it, signp(cp,0), the platform adds
it to the list lwp on the bulletin board. If ω˜i,0(∅) ≥ ω˜p,0, the platform will give user i a
notice that he is a winner. Then the user returns an acknowledgement and his en-
crypted Γi and bi by using the platform’s public key. Receiving the acknowledgement,
the platform adds user i to the winners’ set S (see the line 5 of Algorithm 6.) and noti-
fies each user j ∈ U \ S to compute his encrypted marginal utility per bid, i.e., ω˜j,1, by
using the same method as the computation of ω˜i,0. These users also add their signed
commitments to their corresponding lists lwj on the bulletin board. When the platform
receives all these ω˜j,1, it sorts them, thereby knowing which user has the maximal
encrypted marginal utility per bid. The process is repeated until the (k + 1)-th user’s
ω˜i,k+1(∅) < ω˜p,k+1. Finally, we obtain the winners’ set that consists of k users.
ALGORITHM 6: Winner determination for sensing submodular jobs
Input: User set U , the budget constraint B.
Output: The winners’ set S.
1: S ← ∅; For every j ∈ U , the platform recovers ω˜j,0(S) by using the decryption algorithm,
and sorts all these values in a decreasing order, thereby obtaining the user i with the
maximal encrypted marginal utility per bid, i.e., i← argmaxj∈U ω˜j,0(S);
2: The platform obtains ω˜p,0(S) by using Algorithm 3 and 4 and adds a signed commitment to
the list lwp on the bulletin board;
3: while ω˜i,0(∅) ≥ ω˜p,0 do
4: The platform notices that user i is a winner;
5: Receiving an acknowledgement, the platform adds user i to the winner set S, i.e.,
S ← S ∪ {i};
6: Notify each user j ∈ U \ S to compute his encrypted marginal utility per bid, i.e., ω˜j,|S|,
by using the same method as the computation of ω˜i,0; Obtaining all these encrypted
marginal utilities per bid, the platform finds the user i so that
i← argmaxj∈U\S(ω˜j,|S|(S));
7: The platform obtains ω˜p,|S|(S) by using Algorithm 3 and 4, and adds a signed
commitment to the list lwp on the bulletin board;
8: end while
9: return S;
(b)Payment Determination: At this stage, the encrypted values from the above
OT algorithm cannot support the preserving rank under the multiplication opera-
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tion. To address this challenge, we introduce the homomorphic encryption schemes,
which enable multiplication operation of encrypted values without revealing privacy
about the values themselves and the results of the computation (see equation (3)).
Firstly, at time T , for each winner i ∈ S, its payment computation from the plat-
form is given in the following description. The platform initializes the user set U
′
and set T by using U
′
← U\{i} and T ← ∅. Differentiating from the above win-
ner set, we refer to T as a referenced winner set. Each user j ∈ U
′
\T initially
computes his marginal utility Uj(∅), thereby obtaining his encrypted marginal util-
ity per bid ej,0 = EAI(ωj,0(∅)) by using the AI’s homomorphic encryption public key.
He makes a commit cj,0 by using the above method. Finally, user j signs this com-
mitment cj,0 and the encrypted value ej,0. Then he adds signj(cj,0) to the list l
p
j,i on
these bulletin board (meaning that the list is used to put user j’s commitment for
the computation of user i’s payment) and sends the signj(ej,0) to the platform. Re-
ceiving the values of all users in U
′
, the platform sorts them, thereby obtaining the
user ij with the maximal encrypted marginal utility per bid (i.e., eij ,0). Then the plat-
form notices that user ij is a referenced winner and requests user i for obtaining
the EAI(Ui(j)). After user ij receives the request, he computes the value EAI(Ui(j))
by applying the above MPEP and AI’s encryption public key. Signing it, he sends the
signed EAI(Ui(j)) to the platform. According to the homomorphic encryption, we have
EAI(bi(j)) = EAI(Ui(j) · bij/Uij ) = EAI(Ui(j) · 1/ωij) = EAI(Ui(j))
1/eij . Similarly, we can
obtain EAI(ηi(j)) = EAI(Ui(j) · B/U(Tj−1 ∪ {i})) = EAI(Ui(j) · 1/ωp,j) = EAI(Ui(j))
1/ep,j ,
where ep,j means the encrypted marginal utility per bid when there are j referenced
winners. Since user i is a true winner, the platform knows his bid and sensing prefer-
ence Γi. Thus, the platform can compute the value ep,j . Receiving the value EAI(Ui(j)),
the platform can obtain EAI(bi(j)) and EAI(ηi(j)). Furthermore, the interim payment
can be obtained by using the homomorphic encryption comparison operation. Subse-
quently, the platform adds user ij to the referenced winners’ set. The process is re-
peated until the (k
′
+ 1)-th user’s eij ,k′+1(Tk′ ) < ep,k′+1(T ). Finally, we obtain the
payment of winner i. Other winners’ payments are computed by adopting the same
method as the winner i’s payment. The detailed description is given in Algorithm 7.
5.3.3. Decommitment Round for Verification. Since the mechanism itself is truthful, i.e.,
each user always submits his true cost, we only need to demonstrate that any user can
verify the payment correctness of the platform on his own.
Verification: The verification process is similar to the above description (see Fig. 4).
The only difference is that three dynamic lists in the bulletin board are used to recover
associated values for the payment computation of each user. Generally speaking, some
user initially sends the request of verification to the AI with the probability α. Receiv-
ing the request, the AI runs the algorithm description on the bulletin board with the
help of the values in the three lists until the payment is obtained. For more details of
verification, we refer readers to Section 5.2.4 and Fig. 4.
5.3.4. Privacy-preserving Verifiable Incentive Mechanism for Sensing Submodular Jobs. In our
truthful privacy-preserving verifiable incentive mechanism for sensing Submodular
jobs, the platform determines a winner i’s payment illustrated in Algorithm 8. At the
initial stage, there are some initial parameters specified by the platform. Then, the
platform performs the winner selection algorithm and the payment determination al-
gorithm. Once the platform finishes the payment, the user i will request the AI to
verify the platform’s payment correctness with the probability α. About the detailed
descriptions of privacy preservation and verification are given in Algorithm 6, Algo-
rithm 7 and Algorithm 8.
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ALGORITHM 7: Payment determination for sensing submodular jobs
Input: User set U , the budget constraint B, the set of winners S.
Output: (U , p).
1: for each user i ∈ U do
2: pˆi ← EAI(0);
3: end for
4: for all user i ∈ S do
5: U
′
← U\{i}; the referenced winners’ set T ← ∅;
6: repeat
7: Every j ∈ U
′
computes his encrypted marginal utility per bid ej,|T | = EAI(ωj,|T |(T ))
by using AI’s homomorphic encryption public key for sending to the platform, and adds
a signed commitment signj(cj,|T |) to the list l
p
j,i on these bulletin board; Receiving
these encrypted values, the platform sorts them in a decreasing order, thereby
obtaining the user ij with the maximal encrypted marginal utility per bid, i.e.,
ij ← argmaxj∈U′\T ej,|T |(T );
8: Notice that user ij is a referenced winner and requests user i for obtaining the
EAI(Ui(j));
9: According to the description of Section 5.3.2, the platform computes EAI(bij ) and
EAI(ηi(j)) by applying equation (3); Obtain pˆi ← max{pˆi,min{EAI(bij ), EAI(ηi(j))};
10: Tj−1 ← T ; T ← T ∪ {ij};
11: until e
ij,k
′
+1(Tk′ ) < ep,k′+1(T ) or T = U
′
12: The platform requests the AI for obtaining the payment, i.e., pi = DAI(pˆi), where DAI
denotes the decryption by using the AI’s private key;
13: end for
14: return (U , p);
ALGORITHM 8: PVI-S// Privacy-preserving Verifiable auction mechanism for Crowd sensing
application with sensing Submodular jobs
Input: User set U , the budget constraint B.
Output: (U , p).
1: Initialize the auction information and encryption tools;
2: Choose the winners by applying the algorithm ;
3: Finish the payment for each winner;
4: The user requests the AI to verify the payments with the probability α;
5: return (U , p);
6. PRIVACY, VERIFIABILITY AND REVENUE ANALYSIS
6.1. Privacy of Users and Platform
Our mechanisms’ private information include users’ privacy and platform’s privacy,
i.e., the sensing profile privacy of users and the current winners’ set privacy of the
platform. Assume that there are two kinds of adversaries: adversarial users and ad-
versarial platform or AI. The specific analysis is given as follows.
Lemma 1. The mechanisms PVI-H and PVI-S are privacy-preserving for users.
PROOF. We only need to consider two cases in which the privacy of each user i
may be leaked as follows. The first case is for the adversarial platform or AI. In the
two mechanisms, the platform performs the winners’ selection, and only can know the
(k+1)-th user’s sensing profile Pk+1, but does not know which user it belongs to. In the
stage of verification, similarly, the AI also knows the (k + 1)-th user’s sensing profile
Pk+1, and does not know which user it belongs to. The AI and platform only know the
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encrypted sensing profile, but have no way to decrypt any of them. No other party can
get even more information than the platform or AI. On the one hand, user i gets his
sensing profile Pk+1 through a 1-out-of-z OT from the AI, who is unaware of which
sensing profile have been accessed by the user. User i sends the encrypted sensing
profile to the AI, who cannot decrypt the encrypted sensing profile without knowing
the private key of asymmetric encryption scheme. Even if the AI may know the (k+1)-
th user’s sensing profile later when the platform consults him, he still cannot infer his
user owing to the random number. Thus, the AI cannot know the user of (k + 1)-th
user. Additionally, although the platform can obtain the (k+1)-th user’s sensing profile
later, he can only reversely map the encrypted (k + 1)-th user’s sensing profile to the
original (k + 1)-th user’s sensing profile with the help of the AI. However, the platform
still cannot derive the user, to which (k + 1)-th user’s sensing profile belongs out of at
least k members according to the Theorem 3.2 in [Singer 2010] due to a large number
of users much larger than k existing in the crowd sensing applications. Therefore,
neither the AI, nor platform, can know any user’s sensing profile with the probability
higher than 1/k, thereby guaranteeing k-anonymity.
The second case is for an adversarial user. In the two mechanisms, an adversarial
user j does not learn side information during our mechanisms no matter he is a win-
ner or not. All he learns from the two mechanisms are included in the valid auction’s
Output, i.e., for an adversarial user j’s advantage advPi are all equal to 0 for all i 6= j.
Putting them together, the lemma holds.
Besides, in the following lemma, we also analyze the privacy preservation perfor-
mance of the platform.
Lemma 2. For the current winners’ set S and referenced winners’ set T of the plat-
form (the privacy of the platform), an adversarial user j’s advantage, i.e., advS and
advT , are equal to 0. In other words, the mechanisms PVI-H and PVI-S are privacy-
preserving.
PROOF. For the current winners’ set S and referenced winners’ set T , only plat-
form and AI learn the two sets and each user learns nothing. Since the AI is semi-
honest, and only check the platform randomly, adversarial users gain no useful infor-
mation on the two sets from the communication strings. Thus, the priori probability is
same as the posterior probability, i.e., AdvS = Pr[S|C, Output] − Pr[S|Output] = 0 and
AdvT = Pr[T |C, Output] − Pr[T |Output] = 0. Thus, the mechanisms PVI-H and PVI-S
are privacy-preserving for the platform. Thus, the lemma holds.
Putting these lemmas together, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The mechanisms PVI-H and PVI-S are privacy-preserving.
6.2. Verifiable Correctness of Payments
Lemma 3. The users in the mechanisms PVI-H and PVI-S is truthful.
PROOF. For the mechanism PVI-H, we can easily extend the outcome of the homoge-
nous jobs presented by Singer et al. [Singer 2010] the proof outcome to the heteroge-
neous jobs. For the mechanism PVI-S according to [Yang et al. 2012], since Algorithm
PVI-S is designed based on the MSensing mechanism of [Yang et al. 2012], they have
demonstrated the truthfulness of the mechanism, our mechanism PVI-S is also truth-
ful for users in crowd sensing applications. Thus, the lemma holds.
Generally speaking, the verifiability issue includes the Verifiability of users’ sensing
profile and platform’s payment. From the above lemma 3, we know that users’ bid
is truthful. Besides, each user’s subset of assignments is fixed in our mechanisms.
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Thus, each user’s sensing profile is truthful. Therefore, we only need to guarantee
the verifiable correctness of payments from the platform. Furthermore, we have the
following lemma.
Lemma 4. The two proposed mechanisms, i.e. PVI-H and PVI-S, are correct for a
rational platform.
PROOF. Correctness of both PVI-H and PVI-S, follows from the assumption that
the assumption that the platform is rational and the fine that he pays when checked
cheating is high enough. If his expected utility when complying with both PVI-H and
PVI-S is higher than his expected utility from his deviation he will abide by the algo-
rithm, as such the proposed algorithms i.e. PVI-H and PVI-S, will be correct. We will
show the probability α that the platform’s incorrect payment will not be checked by the
user with the help of the AI, set by the two algorithms i.e. PVI-H and PVI-S, ensures
that the platform’s expected utility is non-positive [Catane and Herzberg 2013]. The
detailed derivation is given as follows. α ≥ pmax/(f + pmax) ⇒ (1 − α)pmax − αf ≤ 0.
Considering the platform’s expected utility, i.e., (1−α)V++αV−, where V+ denotes the
platform’s utility when it gives incorrect payment but is not checked by the users, and
V− denotes the platform’s utility when it gives incorrect payment but is checked by the
users. Again, pmax ≥ V+ and −f = V−, according to the outcome of the above deriva-
tion, further, we have (1 − α)V+ + αV− ≤ (1 − α)pmax − αf ≤ 0. Thus, if the platform
does not comply with the algorithm PVI-H, its expected utility is non-positive. As such,
for a rational platform, it is willing to abide by the rules of both PVI-H and PVI-S, and
gives a correct payment for every user. Finally, the lemma holds.
Putting these lemmas together, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The mechanisms PVI-H and PVI-S are verifiable correctness of pay-
ments.
6.3. Revenue of Platform
Lemma 5. The mechanisms in Section 4 are O(1)-competitive in maximizing the
revenue of the platform.
PROOF. To quantify the revenue of the platform running the mechanisms in Section
4, we compare their revenue with the optimal revenue: the revenue obtainable in the
offline scenario where the platform has full knowledge about users’ sensing profiles.
A mechanism is O(1)-competitive if the ratio between the mechanism’s revenue and
the optimal revenue is a constant factor approximation. According to the Theorem
3.4 in [Singer 2010] and Theorem 4.5 in [Singer 2010], we know that the mechanisms
in Section 4 are budget feasible constant-approximation mechanisms, and no budget
feasible mechanism can do better than mechanisms of Section 4 in maximizing the
homogeneous, heterogeneous sensing revenue and submodular sensing revenue of the
platform. Thus, the lemma holds.
Furthermore, different from the mechanisms in Section 4, mechanisms PVI-H and
PVI-S mainly apply the order preserving encryptions and the OT operations. However,
these encryptions and operations in mechanisms PVI-H and PVI-S do not change the
allocation and payment rules of the mechanisms in Section 4. Thus, mechanisms PVI-
H and PVI-S keep the same revenue as the mechanisms in Section 4, thereby obtaining
the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The mechanisms PVI-H and PVI-S achieve the same revenue as the
generic one without privacy preservation.
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7. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we analyze the communication and computation overhead to show
our construction is both scalable and efficient, thereby applying to mobile devices for
crowd sensing applications. Most of the complexities are linear to the number of users
or the number of assignments, which allows huge number of users or the number of
assignments. Meanwhile, the extra data transmission and the run time introduced by
our mechanisms are almost negligible.
7.1. Simulation Setup
To better evaluate the computation overhead, we implemented the PVI mechanism
in Ubuntu 12.04 using the GMP library based on C in a computer with Intel(R)
Core(TM)i5-3470 CPU 3.20GHz. The order p of the integer group Zp is selected as a
1024-bit prime number, and users can get 128 bits of order-preserving encrypted value
through oblivious transfer with the AI. Every operation is run 100 times to measure
the average run time.
7.2. Performance Evaluation for The PVI-H Mechanism
7.2.1. Bulletin Board Storage Complexity. We require the bulletin board to store the auc-
tion details and dynamic lists used to store the parameters or values accessed by the
platform and AI. In each list, there are only few elements. Therefore, the storage com-
plexity is θ(n), where n is the number of users.
7.2.2. Communication Overhead. The communication overhead based on the data trans-
mission is illustrated in Table I, where lbit is the bit length of the p (i.e. the order of the
integer group Zp).
Note that the computation of accumulated assignments in the winner determination
phase is executed until the platform finds the largest k so that bi ≤ B/
∑
j≤i tj holds.
Thus, the average communication rounds for the platform should be much less than
O(mn), which means that the real communication overhead will be much less than the
worst case O(mnlbit). Since the verification from the AI does not need the communi-
cation for the computation of accumulated assignments, it only requires information
from the existing bulletin board. Thus their communication overhead is negligible.
Fig. 6(a) shows that the overall communication overhead induced by Algorithm PVI-
H. Obviously, the communication overhead is mainly from the OT.
Table I. Communication Overhead of PVI-H
Winner Selection
Send Receive ωi computation User sorting
Users O(n) O(n) O(n) 0
Platform O(nm) O(n) 0 O(n2)
AI O(n) O(n) 0 O(n2)
Payment Determination
Each winner 0 O(1) O(n) 0
Platform O(m2) O(m) 0 O(m2)
AI O(m) O(m) 0 O(m2)
Verification
Each winner O(1) O(1) 0 0
Platform O(n) O(n) 0 O(n2)
AI O(n) O(n) 0 O(n2)
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7.2.3. Computation Overhead. In theory, the overhead of the computation is summa-
rized in Table II.
In the PVI-H mechanism, the auction is composed of the winner selection phase and
the payment determination phase. The winner selection phase mainly includes the OT,
the sorting, users’ blind signature generation and the computation of accumulated as-
signments; the payment determination phase mainly includes the payment calculation
of the platform. For each user’s verification, since data applied to verify the payment
are stored in the bulletin board, the computation overhead of the verification is neg-
ligible when compared with the above parts. Thus, we do not account for it. Next, we
analyze their run time in turn.
Table II. Computation Overhead of PVI-H
Winner selection Payment determination Verification
Users O(1) O(1) O(1)
Platform O(nm2) O(nm3) 0
AI O(1) O(1) O(nm3)
(a)Blind Signature Generation: In the PVI-H mechanism, the signer’s run time
for the user’s one is 19 ms and blindly generating one pair of the Nyberg-Rueppel
signature is 11 µs(microseconds) on average.
(b)Calculation of Assignments and Payment:
Since a single calculation needs 0.4µs on average, and the overall computation over-
head is very small, the run time of the calculation of accumulated assignments and
payment for various number of assignments and payment is almost negligible.
7.3. Performance Evaluation for The PVI-S Mechanism
7.3.1. Bulletin Board Storage Complexity. We require the bulletin board to store the auc-
tion details and three dynamic lists of each user used to store the values accessed by
the AI. In each list, there are only few elements. Therefore, the storage complexity is
θ(n), where n is the number of users.
7.3.2. Communication Overhead. The communication overhead in terms of transmitted
bits is summarized in Table III. Note that the marginal-utility-per-bid computation in
the winner selection and payment determination is executed until the platform and
AI finish the winner selection and the payment determination. Because there are m
different assignments, and each winner should contribute at least one new assignment
to be chosen, the number of winners in the payment determination phase is at mostm.
Thus, the average communication rounds for the platform should be much less than
O(m2), which means the practical communication overhead will be much less than
the worst case O(m2). Besides, the MPEP’s introduction for the marginal-utility-per-
bid computation, makes the communication overhead of each user different with the
PVI-H mechanism (see Table III).
7.3.3. Computation Overhead. In theory, the overhead of the computation is summa-
rized in Table IV.
In general, the PVI-S mechanism consists of the winner selection phase, the pay-
ment determination phase, and the verification phase. The winner selection phase
includes users’ blind signature, the sorting of the platform and the computation of
marginal utility per bid. The payment determination phase includes the sorting of the
platform and the computation of marginal utility per bid. In the verification phase,
since data applied to verify the payment are stored in the bulletin board, the compu-
tation overhead of the verification is negligible when compared with the above parts.
Thus, we do not account for it. Now, we analyze their run times respectively.
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Table III. Communication Overhead of PVI-S
Winner Selection
Send Receive ωi computation User sorting
Users O(n2) O(n2) O(n) 0
Platform O(nm) O(n) 0 O(n2)
AI O(n) O(n) 0 O(n2)
Payment Determination
Each winner 0 O(1) O(n) 0
Platform O(m2) O(m) 0 O(m2)
AI O(m) O(m) 0 O(m2)
Veification
Each winner O(1) O(1) 0 0
Platform O(n) O(n) 0 O(n2)
AI O(n) O(n) 0 O(n2)
Table IV. Computation Overhead of PVI-S
Winner selection Payment determination Verification
Users O(1) O(1) O(1)
Platform O(nm2) O(nm3) 0
AI O(1) O(1) O(nm3)
(a)Sorting, OT and Blind Signature: The PVI-S mechanism’s run time for one
pair of the Nyberg-Rueppel signature including the AI, platform and users is 28 mil-
liseconds on average. Further, we also evaluated the run time of the OT as well as the
final sorting based on the encrypted values. We observed that the computation over-
head of the signature is negligible when compared with the one of the OT and sorting.
Users in the PVI-S have much less run time since they only generate the communica-
tion strings (ciphertexts) (see Fig. 6(b)).
(b)Computation of AI, Platform, Winners and Losers: We compared the com-
putation overhead of the AI, the platform, winners and losers in Fig. 6(c) when the
budget value is 2000. We observed that the computation overhead increases with the
budget constraint and at last they were kept in a stable constant value respectively. It
is because that at this moment the PVI-S mechanism reached saturation point.
(c)Effect of Budget Constraint on Computation Overhead: To assess the effect
of different budget constraints on computation overhead of each winner i, we calcu-
lated the average computation overhead of each winner for different budget values
respectively. We observed that the overall computation overhead increased with the
number of winners at last reached a stable value (see Fig. 6(d)). The computation over-
head of each user is very small, therefore the overhead induced by the PVI-S mecha-
nism also can be applied to wireless mobile devices for crowd sensing applications.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we design two privacy-preserving verifiable incentive mechanisms for
crowd sensing applications. We not only address the privacy preservation of users and
the platform by applying the OPES and OT, but also provide a verification scheme
for the payment correctness from the platform by using the signature technology and
the bulletin board. We preserve the rank of the encrypted values by using the OPES
scheme. Furthermore, we prevent bid repudiation by employing a TLC service. No
party, including the platform, receives any information about bids before the mecha-
nism closes, and no user is able to change or repudiate any sensing profile. Finally,
we design and analyze the two mechanisms. Results from theory analysis and exper-
iments indicate that our privacy-preserving verifiable incentive mechanisms achieve
the same results as the generic one without privacy preservation and apply for mobile
devices in crowd sensing applications. As such, they can apply generally or be extended
to other truthful incentive mechanisms for real crowd sensing environments.
, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January 2014.
Privacy-Preserving Verifiable Incentive Mechanisms for Crowd Sensing Applications A:23
0 100 200 300 400 500
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Number of users
Co
m
m
un
ica
tio
n 
O
ve
rh
ea
d 
(M
B)
 
 
The budget 2000
The budget 4000
The budget 6000
The budget 8000
(a)
0 100 200 300 400 500
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Number of users
R
un
 ti
m
e 
(s)
 
 
Oblivious Transfer
Sorting
Blind Signature
(b)
0 100 200 300 400 500
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Number of users
R
un
 ti
m
e 
(s)
 
 
AI
Platform
Winners
Losers
(c)
0 100 200 300 400 500
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Number of users
R
un
 ti
m
e 
(s)
 
 
Each winner, B=2000
Each winner, B=4000
Each winner, B=6000
Each winner, B=8000
(d)
Fig. 6. (a)Communication overhead of PVI-H with different budgets; (b) Run time of the sorting, the OT
and the blind Signature of PVI-S with the number of users when the value of the budget is 2000; (c)Run
time of the AI, the platform, losers and winners of PVI-S with the number of users when the value of the
budget is 2000; (d)Effect of budget constraint of PVI-S on computation overhead.
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